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Abstract 
Sommers posed the question 'Do We Need Identity?' and answered in the 
negative. According to Sommers, the need for a special identity relation re-
sulted from an arbitrary distinction between concept and object introduced by 
Frege and retained in modern predicate logic (MPL). This is reflected in the 
syntactic distinction between predicate and individual constant. Traditional 
formal logic (TFL) does not respect this distinction and, as a consequence, has 
no need for a special identity relation. But Sommers' position has not gained 
general acceptance. On the contrary, it has received considerable criticism. 
While it is conceded that TFL can express the identity of individual constants, 
it is quickly pointed out that this falls far short of providing the expressiveness 
of the logical identity relation. But the precise extent of the deficit in expres-
siveness, if indeed there is any deficit, has not been determined. It appears that 
Sommers' position on identity has not been adequately formalized to permit 
such a determination. This paper formalizes and extends Sommers' position on 
identity. This formalization is compared with MPL to define precisely the dif-
ference in expressive power. The conclusion is that it has less expressive power 
than MPL, but nonetheless does provide essentially all the expressiveness of 
the logical identity relation. The formal language defined for this investiga-
tion is similar to the language of MPL. The similarity will not only facilitate 
comparison, but perhaps will also make this formal language more palatable to 
readers whose experience and/or predisposition favors MPL. 
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1 Introduction The question 'Do We Need Identity?' was raised by Sommers 
(4, 5]. He answered that a special identity relation is not needed in traditional formal 
logic (TFL), since predication and the laws governing it already allow identity to be 
expressed. But Frege injected a new, and arbitrary, distinction into modern predicate 
logic (MPL), which gave rise to the need for an identity relation. 
The distinction is between concept and object, reflected in the syntactic distinction 
between predicate and individual constant (or name). Its import is that a predicate 
can predicate, but an individual constant cannot. Consequently, two individual con-
stants can be related only under a binary predicate. In particular, two individual 
constants can be declared identical only by a binary identity relation. 
TFL does not respect this distinction. In TFL an individual constant, denoting an 
object, can occupy the predicate position. For example, 'Hans is John' predicates the 
property (concept) of being John to Hans. But if 'John' is a predicate in 'Hans is 
John', consistency dictates that it is a predicate also in 'John is kind', and hence can 
be quantified. Thus 'some John is kind' must be well-formed, and must assert that 
the denotations of the predicates 'John' and 'kind' have nonempty intersection. Since 
'John' is singular (i.e., denotes a singleton set), this is tantamount to asserting that 
the unique element in the set denoted by 'John' is a member of the set denoted by 
'kind'. Therefore, 'John is kind' can be viewed as abbreviation for 'some John is kind'. 
Because of the singularity of the predicate 'John', 'some John is kind' is equivalent 
to 'all John is kind'. To indicate that 'John' is thus simultaneously universally and 
existentially quantified, Sommers writes '*John is kind'. This he calls 'wild quantity'. 
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When the arbitrary distinction between object and concept is eliminated, the need 
for a special identity relation disappears. Thus '*Hans is John' asserts that the deno-
tations of the predicates 'Hans' and 'John' have nonempty intersection (equivalently, 
the denotation of 'Hans' is a subset of the denotation of 'John'), that is, are identi-
cal. Sommers gives a demonstration that for individual constants a and b, the unary 
predication '*a is b' in TFL has all the properties ascribed to the binary predication 
'a = b' in MPL. 
But Sommers' position has not gained general acceptance. On the contrary, it has 
received considerable criticism. While it is conceded that '*a is b' can express the 
identity of individual constants, it is quickly pointed out that this falls far short of 
providing the expressiveness of the logical identity relation. But the precise extent of 
the deficit in expressiveness, if indeed there is any deficit, has not been determined. 
It appears that Sommers' position on identity has not been adequately formalized to 
permit such a determination. 
This paper formalizes and extends Sommers' position on identity. This formalization 
is compared with MPL to define precisely the difference in expressive power. The 
conclusion is that it has less expressive power than MPL, but nonetheless does provide 
essentially all the expressiveness of the logical identity relation. 
The formal language defined for this investigation (hereinafter referred to as 'PCS') 
is similar to the language of MPL (hereinafter referred to as 'PCI'). The similarity 
will not only facilitate comparison, but perhaps will also make PCS more palatable 
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to readers whose experience and/or predisposition favors MPL. PCS differs from PCI 
in that the distinction between predicate and individual constant is not present. 
In the following sections, the syntax and semantics of PCS are defined. Then the 
essential properties of singular expressions are established. To facilitate comparison, a 
conventional definition of PCI is provided. Translation from PCS to PCI demonstrates 
that PCS is equivalent to a subset of PCI. Translation from PCI to PCS is shown to be 
partial only, identifying a deficit in expressiveness of PCS relative to PCI. Therefore, 
there are wffs in PCI for which there are no semantically equivalent wffs in PCS. 
However, for such a wff in PCI, there is a schema in PCS that expresses the same 
meaning. In particular, any theory that can be axiomatized with axiom schemas in 
PCI can be axiomatized with axiom schemas in PCS. The treatment throughout is 
semantic; however, an axiomatic treatment can also be given (see [3]). 
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2 Definition of PCS This section defines PCS, a first-order language that 
formalizes and extends Sommers' ideas regarding singular terms. PCS resembles PCI, 
the language of MPL, with the following difference. Singular predicates supplant 
individual constants and functions. It is not unusual to treat individual constants 
as nullary functions, nor to treat n-ary functions as ( n + 1 )-ary predicates. But it 
appears that these devices have not been used together. When they are, the result 
is a uniformity in the treatment of individual constants, functions and predicates. 
While PCS does not have an identity relation, identity of singular expressions, which 
correspond to terms in PCI, can be expressed. Moreover, deduction with identicals 
can be performed conveniently in PCS. 
2.1 Syntax The vocabulary of PCS is listed first. Let w+ := w- {0}. 
1. Predicate symbols P of two kinds 
(a) ordinary predicate symbols R = UnEw+ Rn, where Rn = {Ri: i E w}, and 
(b) singular predicate symbols S = UnEw+ Sn, where Sn = {Sf : i E w} 
2. Variable symbols V = {Vi : i E w} 
3. Boolean operators A and --, 
4. Quantifier 3 
5. Parentheses ( and ) 
6. Comma, 
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There are no terms in PCS. In their stead, singular expressions are used. These are 
defined as follows: 
1. if S 1 E St and and X E v then S1 (X) is a singular expression 
2. if S"'+l E Sn+l, x, x1 , ..• , Xn E V are distinct and St, ... , Sn are singular expres-
sions, then 3x1(S1(xt) 1\ ···A 3xn(Sn(xn) 1\ S"'+l(xt, ... , Xn, X))···) is a singular 
expression 
3. nothing else is a singular expression 
Expressions in PCS are defined as follows: 
1. if P"' E ('R.n. USn) and Xt, ••• , Xn E V, then P"'(xt, ... , Xn) is an expression 
2. if 4> is an expression then -,4> is an expression 
3. if 4>, 1/J are expressions then ( 4> 1\ 1/J) is an expression 
4. if 4> is an expression and x E V occurs free in 4>, then 3x4> is an expression 
5. nothing else is an expression 
Free and bound variables are defined in the usual way. When a list of variable 
symbols follows an expression symbol, e.g., 4>(xt, ... , xn), these variables are all the 
free variables and only free variables in the expression. When the expression symbol 
is used without a list of variable symbols, it is left open which variables are free in 
that expression. As a general rule, it is assumed that all expressions are rectified. 
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Since the intended interpretation of 3x4>( Xt, • •• , Xn, x) is identical to that of 3y<f>( x1, ... , 
Xn, y ), PCS expressions are defined to be equivalence classes, each equivalence class 
consisting of all alphabetic variants. This equivalence can be defined formally (e.g., 
see Barnes and Mack [1 ]), but this will not be done here. Any member of a given 
equivalence class will be used to represent the class. Hence the two forms given above 
represent the same PCS expression. 
In the sequel, parentheses are dropped whenever no confusion can result. Metavari-
ables are used as follows: Rn ranges over Rn; sn ranges over Sn; pn ranges over 
Rn USn; x, y, z range over V; S ranges over singular expressions; and 4>, 'lj;, () range 
over expressions. Applying subscripts to these symbols does not change their ranges. 
2.2 Semantics An interpretation of PCS is a pair I = (V, 9) where V is a 
nonempty set and 9 is a mapping defined on P satisfying: 
1. if Rn ERn, then 9(Rn) ~ vn 
2. if sn+l E Sn+b then 9(Sn+l) ~ vn+l such that for all d1 , ... , dn E V there 
exists dE V with (dt, ... , dn, d) E 9(Sn+l) and for all d' E 'D, (d1 , ... , dn, d') E 
9(Sn+l) implies d' = d 
Let g E vv be an assignment of values to variables, and 4> be an expression of PCS. 
Then 4> is satisfied by g in I (written If= <f>[g]) iff one of the following holds: 
1. 4> = pn(Xt, ... ,xn) and (g(xl), ... ,g(xn)) E 9(Pn) 
2. 4> = •'l/J and I~ 'lj;[g] 
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3. 4> = 7/J A(} and (I p 7/J[g] and I p 8[g]) 
4. 4> = 3xtjJ, where x occurs free in 7/J, and there exists g' E 'Dv that agrees with g 
off x such that I f= tP [g1 
An expression 4> is true in I, written I I= </>, iff for all g E 'Dv, I I= <f>[g]. </> is valid, 
written p </>, iff </> is true in every interpretation. 
2.3 Abbreviations 
abbreviations. 
1. tP V (} := •( ...,7/J A •8) 
2. '1/J -+ () := •( '1/J A •0) 
It is convenient to extend PCS by introducing the following 
3. '1/J +-+ (} := (¢-+ 8) A (0-+ ¢) 
The semantics for these abbreviations can be given directly as follows: 
1. If </> = '1/J V () then I p </>[g] iff (I p '1/J[g] or I p 8[g]) 
2. If 4> = '1/J -+ (} then If= </>[g] iff (I p '1/J[g] implies I p O[g]) 
3. If 4> = '1/J +-+(}then If= </>[g] iff (If= ,P[g] iff If= O[g]) 
4. If </> = Vx,P, where x occurs free in ¢, then I f= <f>[g] iff for all g' E vv that 
agree with g off x, I p tjJ[g'] 
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3 Properties of singular expressions Singular expressions play a central 
role in PCS. The denotation of a singular expression is a single (though not neces-
sarily unique) individual. Singular expressions commute in a certain way with the 
Boolean operators. The principal result is that not only unary singular predicates, 
corresponding to individual constants in PCI, but more generally singular expressions 
exhibit 'wild quantity'. These results are established in this section. 
In the following, if </>(xt, ... , xn) is a wff, I f= </>[dt, ... , dn] will abbreviate I f= </>[g] 
where g E 1JV such that g(xt) = dt, ... ,g(xn) = dn. 
LEMMA 1 There exists d E V such that I f= S[d] and for all d' E 'D, I f= S[d'] 
implies d' = d. 
proof: Define the depth of a singular expression as follows. depth(S1(x)) := 0. 
depth(3xt(St(Xt)A· · ·!\3xn(Sn(xn)!\Sn+l(xt, ... , Xn, x)) · · ·)) := 1+max{depth(Si(xi)) : 
1 < i ~ n }. The proof is a straightforward induction on the depth of S(x ). 
In the following, Lemma 1 will be abbreviated 3!d E V: If= S[d]. 
THEOREM 2 IF 3xt(St(xt)A· · ·!\3xn(Sn(xn)A•</>(xt, ... , Xn)) · · ·) iffi f= •3x1(S1 (xt)A 
· · · !\ 3xn(Sn(xn) !\ </>(xt, ... , Xn)) · · ·). 
proof: I F 3xt ( St (xt) !\ · · · !\ 3xn( Sn( Xn) !\ •</>( Xt, . .. , Xn)) · · ·) iff 3!d1 · · · 3ldn : 
(I F St[dt]) !\ '· · !\ (I F Sn[dn])!\ (I F •</>[dt, ... , dn]) iff 3!dt · • · 3!dn : (I F 
St[dt))A· ··!\(IF Sn[dn])!\ (I l;b </>[dt, ... , dn]) iff I l;b 3xt(St(Xt)A· · ·!\3xn(Sn(Xn)A 
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¢>(x1 , ••• , Xn)) · .. ) iff I f= --,3x1(S1 (xt) /\ · · · /\ 3xn(Sn( Xn) /\ <P(xb ... , Xn)) · · ·) (follows 
from the definition of satisfaction and Lemma 1). 
COROLLARY 3 If= 3xt(St(Xt)A· · ·/\3xn(Sn(Xn)A¢>(xt, ... , Xn)) · · ·) iffi F 'Vxt(St(xt) ~ 
· · · ~ 'v'xn(Sn(xn) ~ <P(xb ... , Xn)) · · ·). 
Using the notation of restricted quantification, this result can be recognized as as-
serting the 'wild quantity' of singular expressions, e.g., (3x : S(x))(¢>(x)) +-+ ('Vx : 
S(x))(<P(x)). 
THEOREM 4 I f= 3x1(S1(x1) /\ · · • /\ 3xn(Sn(Xn) A <P(xiu · · ·, Xi1) A 1/J(xiu · · ·, Xim)) · · ·) 
iff (I f= 3xi1 (Si1 (xs1 ) /\ • • • /\ 3xi1 (8;1 (xi,)/\ <P(xiu ... , Xi1)) • • ·) and I f= 3xil (Sil (xil) /\ 
· · · /\ 3 X im ( S im (X im) /\ tP (X il , ••• , X im ) ) · · ·)) 1 where { i 1 , ... , i I} U {j 1 , ... , J m } = { 1 , ... , n} . 
proof: If= 3xl(SI(xl) /\ · · · /\ 3xn(Sn(xn) /\ <P(xiu· .. , Xi1 ) /\ 1/J(xiu ... , Xim)) ···)iff 
3!dl "· 3!dn : (IF 81 [d1])/\ .. · /\ (IF Sn[dn])/\ (I F ( </>(Xip · .. , Xi1 ) /\1/J(xil, · .. , Xim) 
[dil' ... 'dim]) iff 3!dl ... 3!dn :(I F sl [dl])/\· .. /\(I F Sn[dn])A (I F <P[dil' ... 'di,])/\ 
(I F ¢[diu ... , dim]) iff (I F 3xi1 (Si1 ( Xi1 ) /\ " • /\ 3xs,(Si1 ( Xi1 ) /\ </>( Xiu ... , Xi1)) .. ·)) 
/\(I F 3xj1 (Sil (Xj1 ) /\ .. • /\ 3xim(Sim(xim) /\ 1/J(xiu· .. , Xim)) .. ·)) (follows from the 
definition of satisfaction and Lemma 1). 
Thus singular expressions distribute over conjunction. Examples, using the notation 
of restricted quantification, are: (3x: S(x))(¢>(x)/\¢(x)) +-+ ((3x: S(x))(¢>(x))A(3x: 
S(x))(¢(x))) and ('Vx: S(x))(<P(x) /\ ¢()) +-+ (('v'x: S(x))(<P(x)) /\ ¢()). 
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4 PCS and PCI Compared The expressiveness of PCS relative to PCI will 
be investigated through the use of meaning-preserving translations between the two 
languages. Translation from PCS to PCI is not surjective. The difference of PCI and 
the image of PCS in PCI will give the deficit in expressiveness. 
To facilitate definition of a translation function, a brief definition of PCI will first be 
given. This definition is standard, but chosen to parallel the definition of PCS given 
in Section 2. 
4.1 Definition of PCI The vocabulary of PCI consists of the following. 
1. Predicate symbols R = UnEw+ Rn, where Rn = { Ri : i E w} 
2. Individual constant symbols C = { Ci : i E w} 
3. Function symbols :F = UnEw+ Fn, where Fn = {f? : i E w} 
4. Variable symbols V = {Vi: i E w} 
5. Boolean operators A and ..., 
6. Identity relation = 
7. Quantifier 3 
8. Parentheses ( and ) 
9. Comma, 
Terms in PCI are defined as follows: 
12 
1. individual constant symbols and variable symbols are terms 
2. if fn E Fn and it, . .. , in are terms, then fn(tt, ... , in) is a term 
3. nothing else is a term 
In the following, i will be used as a metavariable ranging over terms of PCI. 
Expressions in PCI are defined as follows: 
1. if Rn ERn and it, ... , in are terms, then Rn(it, ... , in) is an expression 
2. if i 1 , i 2 are terms, then i 1 = i2 is an expression 
3. if </> is an expression then -,¢> is an expression 
4. if l/J, '1/; are expressions then ( ¢J 1\ '1/;) is an expression 
5. if ¢Y is an expression and x E V occurs free in l/J, then 3x¢> is an expression 
6. nothing else is an expression 
An interpretation of PCI is a pair I= (D, Q) where Dis a nonempty set and Q is a 
mapping defined on P satisfying: 
2. if c E C, then Q(c) ED 
3. if fn E Fn, then Q(fn) E -p'D" 
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4. Q( =) is the diagonal relation on 1) 
Let g e vv be an assignment of values to variables. Define an extension g* of g to 
the set of terms of PCI as follows: 
1. if x E V, then g*(x) := g(x) 
2. if c E C, then g*(c) := Q(c) 
3. if/"' E Fn. and t1, ... , tn are terms, theng*(J"'(tl, ... , tn.)) := Q(f"')(g*(tl), ... ,g*(tn.)) 
Let 4> be an expression of PCI. Then 4> is satisfied by g in I (written If= f/>[g]) iff one 
of the following holds: 
1. 4> = R"'(h, ... , tn) and (g*(tl), ... ,g*(tn)) E Q(R"') 
2. 4> = (t1 = t2) and g*(tl) = g*(t2) 
3. 4> = ...,tP and I ~ 1P[g] 
4. 4> = tP A() and (I F 1P[g] and I f= 8[g]) 
5. 4> = 3x1P, where x occurs free in 1P, and there exists g' E vv that agrees with g 
off x such that If= tP[91 
The usual definitions and notational conventions defined for PCS carry over to PCI. 
4.2 Translation to PCI A translation function r from PCS into PCI is defined 
as follows. For atomic expressions: 
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2. Sl( X) f-+ Cj = X 
This definition for atomic expressions is extended to a {A, •, (3x )xev )-homomorphism. 
Let I = (V, 9) and I' = (V, 9') be interpretations of PCS and PCI, respectively, 
over the same universe. Then I and I' are similar iff 
1. 9(Ri) = 9'(Rf) 
2. 9(Sl) ={(d)} iff 9'(ci) = d 
3. (dt, ... ,dn,d) E 9(Si+l) iff9'(fr)(dt, ... ,dn) = d 
LEMMA 5 Let I and I' be similar interpretations of PCS and PCI, respectively, over 
universe 1J. Let g E vv and</> E PCS. Then If= </>[g) iff I' f= T(</>)[g]. 
proof: The proof is a straightforward induction on the structure of ¢>. 
Thus T is a mapping of PCS into PCI. 
4.3 Translation from PCI Next consider a translation T 1 of PCI into PCS, 
defined for atomic expressions: 
1. Ci = x r-+ Sl(x) 
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2. Ci = t ~ 3x(Sl(x) A r'(t = x)), where t ¢ V 
4. ff(x~, ... , Xn) = t ~ 3x(Si+l(x~, ... , Xn, x) A r'(t = x)), where t ¢ V 
5. ff(t~, ... ,tn) = t ~ 3xk1 (r'(tk1 = xkJ A··· A 3xkm(r'(tkm = Xkm)A 3x(r'(t = 
x)ASf+l(x1, ... , Xn, x)) ···),where t, tk1 , ••• , tkm f/_ V and ( { t1, ... , tn}-{ tk1 , • ·., tkm}) 
~v 
6 . .R'/(lt, ... , tn) ~ 3Xk1 (r'(tk1 = Xk1 )A·· ·A3xkm ( r'(tkm = Xkm)A R'/(xt, · · ·, Xn)) · · · ), 
where tkn· .. , tkm fj. V and ( {tt, ... , tn}- {tkn·. ·, tkm}) ~ V 
As with T, this definition of r' for atomic expressions is extended to a (A, •, (3x )xev}-
homomorphism. Note that r' is partial since r'(x1 = x2) is not defined. Let PCit be 
the domain of r'. 
LEMMA 6 Let I and I' be similar interpretations of PCS and PC!, respectively, over 
universe V. Let g E vv and tf; E PCI1 • Then I' f= tf;[g] iff If= r'(.,P)[g]. 
proof: The proof is a straightforward induction on the structure of t/J. 
Therefore, PCS and PCI1 are equivalent in expressiveness, and any deficit in expres-
siveness of PCS is restricted to the difference PCI- PCI1 • More precisely, any deficit 
in expressiveness of PCS is restricted to those wffs of PCI- PCI1 containing nonelim-
inable occurrences of atomic expressions of the form x1 = x 2 • Occurrences of atomic 
expressions of the form x1 = x2 in a wff tf; are eliminable iff there exists a wff tf;' such 
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that for any interpretation I of PCI, IF .,P' iff I F .,P. Let PCh be the set of wffs 
containing noneliminable occurrences of expressions of the form Xt = x2. That PCI2 
is not empty is shown next. 
Consider the unary predicate m E PCI and let .,p = 3xtVx2(m(x2) +-+ (x2 = Xt)). 
Then in any interpretation I'= (V,Q} of PCI, I' F .,P only if card(Q(m)) = 1. The 
next lemma shows that PCS is indifferent to this property. 
LEMMA 7 There is no closed wff <P E PCS such that for every interpretation I = 
(V, 9} of PCS, I F <P only if card(Q(m)) = 1. 
proof: Let <P E PCS and let n E w such that if SJ occurs in <P then j < n. Let 
It = {w, 9t} and I 2 = {w, Y2} be interpretations of PCS, where Yt and 92 are defined 
as follows. 9t(m) = { (n}} and 9 2(Rf,) = {(n}, {m}} for n < m, and for all other 
predicates R} of PCS, 9t(R}) = 92(R}) = 0. For all singular predicates SJ of PCS, 
9t(Sj) = 92(Sj) = {{it, ... , iz-t,j} :it, ... , iz-t E w }. 
It suffices to show the following. If <Pis any rectified wff of PCS with free variables 
Xt, •.. , xz, then 3it, ... , iz E w: It F </J[it, ... , iz] iff 3jt, ... ,jz E w: I2 F <P[it, ... ,jz]. 
The proof is by induction on the structure of </J. 
For the basis, let <P = P1(x 17 ••• , xz) where P1 is an ordinary or singular predicate 
of PCS. First suppose that It F P 1[i1, ... , iz]. Define bi1 , ••• , bi, as follows. For 
1 ~ k < I, if i~c =f:. m then jk = i~c and if i~c = m then jk = m + 1. It follows from 
the definitions of 9 1 and Q2 that I 2 F P1[j17 ••• ,jz]. For the converse, suppose that 
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I 2 I= P1[it, ... ,j1]. Define it, ... , iz as follows. For 1 < k :5 l, if ik =f. m then i~e = j~e 
and if jk = m then i~e = n. Again it follows from the definitions of 9t and Q2 that 
It I= P1[i17 ••• , iz]. Hence It I= P1 [i~, ... , iz] iff I2 I= P1[it, ... ,jz]. 
The induction step is straightforward. 
It remains to show that the deficit in expressiveness of PCS relative to PCI is exactly 
PCI2. 
THEOREM 8 Let I' and I be similar interpretations of POI and POS, respectively, 
and .,P be a wff of POI. There exists a wff ¢> of POS such that {I' I= .,P[g] iff I I= tf>[g)} 
iff '1/J ¢ P0/2. 
proof: The 'if' direction is an immediate corollary of Lemma 6. For the 'only if' 
direction, suppose ¢>is a wff of PCS such that I' I= .,P[g] iff I I= tf>[g]. By Lemma 5, 
I' I= T(t/>)[g] iff I I= tf>[g]. By definition, T(t/>) has no occurrences of atomic expressions 
of the form Xt = x2. Therefore, .,P ¢ PCI2. 
While the meaning ofthe wff 3xt Vx2(.m(x2) +-+ (x2 = Xt)) of PCI cannot be expressed 
by a wff of PCS, the meaning can be expressed by a schema of PCS. Indeed an identity 
relation can be defined by the schema I: 
THEOREM 9 Let I= (V, Q} be a POS model of schema I. Then Q(_m) is the diagonal 
relation on V' ={dE V: It= S[d], where Sis a singular expression}. 
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proof: Let d~, d2 E 1J such that I f= S1[d1] and I f= S2[d2]. Then I f= R6[d~, d2] 
iff I F 3xl(Sl(xl) A 3x2(S2(x2) A m(xt,x2))) (definition of satisfaction) iff I F 
3x(S1(x) A S2(x)) (schema 1.) iff 3!d E 1J: (If= St[d]) A (I f= S2[d]) (definition of 
satisfaction and Lemma 1) iff d1 = d2 • 
1J' is the set of named elements of the universe 'D. It follows from the theorem that for 
any set of axiom schemas in PCI there exists a semantically equivalent set of axiom 
schemas in PCS. 
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5 Conclusion Sommers' position on identity has not received the attention it 
deserves. Part of the reason is perhaps that his argument was presented in the context 
of the Calculus of Terms ([6]), running counter to the prevailing bias that only MPL 
can be taken seriously. Further, his argument appears to be incomplete, dealing only 
with individual constants. 
This paper gives a full answer to Sommers' question, 'Do We Need Identity?'. The 
argument is couched in MPL, modified only as much as necessary to eliminate the 
distinction between concept and object. The answer given here essentially supports 
Sommers' position. 
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